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a b s t r a c t
A multi-disciplinary approach to designing safer healthcare was utilised to investigate risks in the bed-
space in elective surgical wards. The Designing Out Medical Error (DOME) project brought together
clinicians, designers, psychologists, human factors and business expertise to develop solutions for the
highest risk healthcare processes. System mapping and risk assessment techniques identiﬁed nearly 200
potential failure modes in hand hygiene, isolation of infection, vital signs monitoring, medication de-
livery and handover of information. Solutions addressed issues such as the design of equipment, re-
minders, monitoring, feedback and standardisation. Some of the solutions, such as the CareCentre,
which brings many of the processes and equipment together into one easy to access workstation at the
foot of the bed, have been taken forward to clinical trials and manufacture. The project showed the value
of the multi-disciplinary and formal human factors approaches to healthcare design for patient safety. In
particular, it demonstrates the application of human factors to a complete design cycle and provides a
case study for the activities required to reach a safe, marketable product.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd and The Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved.
1. The opportunity for human factors in healthcare
Human factors/ergonomics is now a constituent part of safety
management and systems design in many industries (HSE, 2005;
ISO 6385:2004). This is less so in healthcare, where there are still
only a few exemplar projects demonstrating either the beneﬁt, or
the methods, of a Human Factors (HF) approach. The complexity of
healthcare delivery means that there are extensive opportunities
for human factors to contribute to improvements. A single patient
journey can cross the primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare
sectors. Care might be delivered by multi-disciplinary, distributed
and virtual teams, often with poor communication between
healthcare workers and organisations, entrenched hierarchies and
little overview of the overall patient journey. Healthcare staff work
in shared work-spaces with complex patients, tasks and equip-
ment, all of which make a formal consideration of human factors
necessary. Within this complexity there are clear opportunities to
apply HF to common, identiﬁable components of the system. This
paper describes a project that takes a systems approach to a
particularly ubiquitous setting, the design of the bed-space and
demonstrates the application of human factors to a complete
design cycle; from context exploration through to manufactured
product. The project used human factors principles and method-
ology to identify risks, engage healthcare staff and patients, facili-
tate ideas and develop new designs for the environment, right
through to manufacture. Applying HF to a common workspace e
the bedside e means that the methods and solutions should be
transferable to many other clinical specialties. In particular, it pro-
vides an important demonstration of the process of applying human
factors using a multi-disciplinary team that engages clinicians,
designers and human factors professionals. This provides a model
that can be applied in other healthcare contexts in the future.
2. The size of the problem
There are around 100,000 reports of patient safety incidents
(PSIs) per month to the UK National Patient Safety Agency’s (NPSA)
Reporting and Learning Service (RLS) from NHS Trusts in England
and Wales (NPSA, 2012). Other sources of estimated harm, pre-
dominantly using reviews of patient records, place the rate of in-
hospital adverse events (unintended injury or complication) at
almost 1 in 10 admissions (de Vries et al., 2008).
While these ﬁgures are high, they must be considered in
perspective of the scale of the NHS (there were 15 million A&E
attendances and 85 million outpatient appointments in England
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during 2010 (NHS IC, 2010)) and that many PSIs are reported as
causing no harm (69% in 2010/1 e NPSA, 2012). Yet there is also a
recognised under-reporting of patient safety incidents; there are
around 300 million GP consultations in England each year but GP
reported incidents account for less than 1% of the total reported to
the NPSA. Paradoxically, voluntary reporting of incidents is likely
to increase as a positive safety culture develops within an orga-
nisation (Hutchinson et al., 2009). Each of these conspires to make
it difﬁcult to know the extent of unintentional harm in healthcare,
and in particular the detail of what goes wrong. Together with the
already risky nature of treating seriously ill patients, this has
meant there has been a slow acceptance of the high risk nature of
healthcare. This is now changing. Landmark reports such as the
USA Institute of Medicine’s ‘To Err is Human’ (Kohn et al., 2000)
and better incident reporting are helping to establish e as deVries
puts it e that ‘adverse events [in healthcare] are a serious
problem’.
3. Establishing human factors in healthcare
Along with the relatively recent recognition of the safety issues
in healthcare, human factors is also beginning to gain interest
(NPSA, 2010). There are some notable examples of human factors
improvements, particularly the standards formedical device design
(e.g. AAMI, 2009), the recognition of human factors by groups such
as the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2009) and a general
promotion of human factors thinking (Reason, 1995; Vincent et al.,
2004; Carayon et al., 2006; Norris, 2011; Hollnagel, 2012). The
previous understanding of human factors as primarily ‘person level’
issues (such as teamwork and communication) (NHS III, 2010) is
still common, but human factors principles (such as reducing
complexity and variability, design for standardisation and standard
procedures) and methods (such as co-design, Prospective Hazard
Analysis (PHA) techniques or Human Factors Integration) are now
developing.
As a result, there are many examples where an absence of hu-
man factors or user-centred design is evident. Research on infusion
pumps (programmable devices which control the rate of ﬂow of
medication through intravenous infusions) found there could be up
to thirty different models in use within one organisation, many
with differing and/or conﬂicting interface design (NPSA, 2004a).
Colour-coded wristbands have been used to alert staff to a patient’s
special status (e.g. allergies or risk of falls), yet different colour
coding conventions have existed within the same organisation
(Sevdalis et al., 2009). Local variation and bespoke procedures are
common and even considered necessary, as local circumstances are
often considered unique.
However, rather than focussing the human factors argument on
examples of poor design, if we are to help establish human factors
in healthcare it is more helpful to ﬁnd positive examples of change
and demonstrations of methodology. Reiling (2006) and Ulrich
et al. (2008) both give good examples of user-centred approaches
to healthcare design. This paper aims to help demonstrate the value
of human factors by providing examples of design solutions and
demonstrating a methodology to achieve this.
4. Human factors in the design of medical devices and
equipment
Physical products are a component of virtually all healthcare
processes, from seemingly innocuous equipment such as patient
identity wristbands and bedside lockers through to cutting edge
medical devices that keeps patients alive. The design of devices,
equipment, workspaces, medication (pills, packaging and pre-
scribing systems) and information systems is therefore vital to the
safe delivery of care. According to the NPSA’s RLS, around 35,000
patient safety incidents are reported each year in England and
Wales associated with medical devices and equipment and around
100 of those resulted in death or severe harm (NPSA, 2012). An
analysis of these incidents from 2006 to 2007 found the most
frequently cited equipment were pumps, catheters/cannula, beds
and hoists and resuscitation and surgical equipment. Contributory
factors included the design of the equipment (‘equipment not
operating as intended’) or the systems within which they are used
(‘equipment unavailable’) (NPSA, 2008). Designing for safety is a
becoming a recognised concept in healthcare (Karsh and Scanlon,
2007) but usability issues are unlikely to be recognised or re-
ported. For instance, research into infusion pumps incidents found
that of 25% of devices reported as faulty had no fault (NPSA, 2004b).
International standards and regulations do require manufacturers
to carry out usability testing (e.g. ISO/IEC 62366:2008; FDA, 2011)
but as an ‘end user’, healthcare appears to be less demanding of
good usability than perhaps other industries. This provides little
incentive for improvements beyond the minimum required. Other
barriers to usability improvements in medical devices (and thereby
a reduction in user error) include:
 Financial constraints on healthcare organisations
 Legacy/existing equipment with recognised usability issues
that have to remain in service such as pumps or monitors
 Limited usability or human factors support during procurement
 Donated equipment
 A focus on competency and training as a route to safety in
healthcare, and a subsequent reticence to blame design (‘it’s a
poor doctor that blames their tools’)
 Impetus to fast-track new developments in diagnosis/treat-
ment without consideration of usability
 A poor contextual match between existing work systems and
new technology being introduced
 The difﬁculty in accessing healthcare settings for equipment
design research or evaluation.
The DOME project therefore focused on medical devices and
equipment with the aim of encouraging the use of a HF in equip-
ment design (as opposed to the design of procedures and processes,
although a systems approach would of course consider those
working practices and their effect on safety).
5. DOME: designing out medical error
Human factors would endorse a systems approach to ensure the
usability and safety of healthcare systems, and the medical equip-
ment and devices that are part of those systems. Designing Out
Medical Error (DOME) was a three year project that applied the
systems approach to the design of medical devices and equipment. It
was a multi-disciplinary project involving designers, clinicians,
psychologists, human factors professionals and business experts. The
overall aim of the study as described herewas to develop a process to
design safer medical devices and equipment. The objectives were:
 To develop a multi-disciplinary approach to designing for
safety that would provide long term engagement and potential
for future design collaborations
 To develop a map, analyse and prioritise the hazards in the
surgical wards
 To develop design solutions using a systems approach and co-
design methods.
This paper describes the key aspects of the project, such as:
disciplines working together to understand risk and co-develop
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solutions; the large number of processes e and potential failures in
those processese that take place around the bed-side, just one part
of the patient journey; the commonality of causes across multiple
failures; and in particular how tackling those causes across a range
of processes simultaneously can help to develop effective solutions.
5.1. System boundaries
This study took a systems approach that meant all of the pro-
cesses within surgical wards were to be considered, similar to the
approach developed by Carayon et al. (2006). The study aimed to
produce design solutions that could be taken forward for manu-
facture and widespread implementation. Within the surgical ward
setting, a further focus was the hospital bed/treatment space or the
bed-side. The investigation focused on patient admission through
to discharge in the surgical ward, taking into account but not
focussing on, surgery in the operating theatre and any related ac-
tivities in primary care outside the hospital. This allowed the in-
ﬂuence of the entire system of healthcare to be considered whilst
providing a manageable and deﬁned area to target.
5.2. Multi-disciplinarity
One of the key objectives of the project was to develop a multi-
disciplinary process for developing healthcare solutions. Embed-
ding a human factors approach in healthcare requires clinical staff
to be pivotal in the analysis of systems and development of solu-
tions, and for designers to have access to clinical staff and work-
places. Making HFE and design methods accessible and palatable
for all users was part of this engagement process. A collaborative
approach was adopted that aimed for knowledge and skill transfer
between clinicians, designers, psychologists and business experts
as well as human factors expertise. Each discipline was vital to the
success of the project:
 Clinical and subject matter expertise was required to under-
stand clinical processes, healthcare environments and systems
 Design knowledge and skills were needed to develop creative
solutions
 Psychologists and human factors expertise was needed to un-
derstand the genesis of human error and the systems approach
to safety and design, and to initiate valid methodology
approaches
 Business experts enabled the application of risk management
approaches and solutions from other industries.
Multi-disciplinary design is difﬁcult to achieve in healthcare as
there are very real limits to clinicians’ time and to the access to
clinical environments. It can be difﬁcult for designers to access
clinical areas without the help of a clinician, and clinicians seeking
to develop innovations often do not have access to the design and
business knowledge needed to see their ideas through to realisa-
tion. To ensure true multi-disciplinarity, the research teamworked
side-by-side on all phases of the project, sharing all research
methods. Shared-site working was adopted so that the design staff
had regular access to the hospital environment and clinical staff
were able to access resources within the design centre.
6. Methodology
Multiple methods were used to analyse processes around the
bed-space, identify potential failures and to develop and test
appropriate solutions. Observations, semi-structured interviews and
shadowing of staff and patients allowed the tasks, equipment,
communication, information sources and environment of the bed-
space to be recorded in detail. A structured survey and rating scales
were used to gather user perspectives on safety and Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was used to analyse and prioritise po-
tential failures. The design phase utilised focus groups, brainstorming
and co-design techniques, with simulation and clinical trials being
used to evaluate prototypes. See Anderson et al. (2012a) for a detailed
description of the methodology.
The ﬁrst step in a human factors approach to systems design is
to understand the healthcare processes in question. Observations
and shadowing carried out jointly by the research teams ensured
that multi-disciplinary perspectives on the data could be ob-
tained. The inclusion of a clinician in the team was crucial to be
able to represent clinical knowledge and to understand tacit skills;
likewise, the designers were able to view the processes and
environment from a design and safety perspective. It is unlikely
that enough understanding of processes and the subsequent
hazard analysis would have been possible without this joint
perspective. As well as focussing on the ward, data were gathered
from the wider parts of the hospital system such as the clinical
risk departments, clinical engineering, cleaning, microbiologists,
and from thewider NHS landscape such as the procurement chain,
innovation hubs and the medical device industry. An interactive
map was developed of the overall patient journey, which allowed
multiple layers of the system around the bedside to be con-
structed. This allowed visualisation of the whole patient journey
with associated activities, plus annotations embedded at each
stage to describe and visualise associated staff, equipment, tasks
and workspace.
A work analysis based on 70 h of observation on ﬁve general
surgery wards at three hospitals during the day, night andweekend
(see Anderson et al., 2012a for details) identiﬁed fourteen top-level
healthcare processes (shown in Table 1).
Given the large number of activities observed within surgical
wards, the highest risk processes were prioritised by healthcare
workers, patients and visitors (these were hand hygiene, vital signs
monitoring, isolation of infection, medication delivery and hand-
over of information) and an HFMEA was used to identify how each
of the surgical ward healthcare processes could fail.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is an established,
prospective risk analysis tool that has been adapted for use in
healthcare (Healthcare FMEA or HFMEA) by the US Veterans As-
sociation (DeRosier et al., 2002). Since 2002the Joint Commission
for Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations has required USA
healthcare organisations to complete an FMEA on at least one high
risk process per year (Spath, 2003). A scan of the literature would
suggest that FMEA is now a popular tool in patient safety having
been applied to a wide variety of scenarios [such as the registra-
tion of trauma patients (Day et al., 2007); IV medication (Adachi
and Lodolce, 2005); medication errors (Crane and Crane, 2006);
the management of TB patients (Tellefsen, 2005); and the
discharge process (Anthony et al., 2005)]. Anderson et al. (2012a)
describe how the HFMEA identiﬁed nearly 200 failure modes in
the ﬁve surgical ward healthcare processes. The causes of the
high-risk failure modes in each of the processes were identiﬁed
using Vincent’s classiﬁcation of system contributory factors
(Vincent et al., 1998) and the high-level causes are shown in
Table 2.
Table 2 shows that design was cited as a cause of prioritised
high-risk failures in all ﬁve processes, an issue that might be
overlooked by traditional healthcare investigations. A lack of re-
minders, and poor monitoring of staff performance and feedback
were also common, together with poor measurement, a lack of
standardisation and simpliﬁcation, issues with leadership, clear
team roles and responsibilities, education, training and testing and
patient safety not being a priority.
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6.1. Stage 7: the design phase
The research yielded a rich picture of the most risky processes,
where they were most likely to fail, and the causes behind these
failures. This information had to be translated into a set of mean-
ingful design briefs for subsequent design work.
These captured the research ﬁndings, providing realistic bound-
aries for designwork, and inspired a breadth of ideas. The briefs were
based on the on the broad system causes of the failures rather than
rooting them in certain, speciﬁc failures. For instance, rather than
focussing on failures such as ‘failure to wear gloves and apron’,
‘failure to use sterile wipes on equipment’ the briefs addressed
Table 1
Healthcare processes and associated tasks observed on surgical wards.
Processes Tasks
Domestic cleaning  Changing beds
 Cleaning ﬂoor or bedside equipment
 Cleaning of vital signs monitoring equipment
 Move bed/furniture
 Wet ﬂoor safety signs
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
Post-operative
mobilisation
 Re-positioning patient in the bed/turning
 Sitting up/out
 Chest exercises/CoughingTransferring
 Use of wheelchair
 Standing
 Walking on the ﬂat (with or without aid)
 Walking on the stairs (off the ward)
 Use of bedside controls
 Use of bedside rails
 Move bed/furniture
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
Use of bedside rails  Use of bedside rails
 Use of bedside controls
Hand hygiene  Hand hygiene
 Alcohol gel
 Soap and water
Vital signs monitoring
(‘Observations’)
 Observing patient from nursing station
 Cleaning of vital signs monitoring equipment
 Vital signs measuring and recording (blood
pressure/pulse/respiratory rate/pulse oximetry/
temperature/ﬂuid balance/urine output/
blood sugars)
 Use of urinary catheter
 Use of NG tube
 Use of drains
 Move bed/furniture
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
Correct site surgery  Consent/marking
 Pre-operative checklist
Medication delivery  Dispensing medication
 Use of PCA
 Management of IV lines and drip stands
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
Ward round  Ward round
 History taking
 Examinations
 Move bed/furniture
 Writing notes/forms
 Using the computer
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
Staff hand-over  Using the telephone
 Use of bleeps
 Writing notes/forms
 Hand-over at shift change (at nurse’s station)
 Hand-over at shift change (in staff room)
 Hand-over at bedside
Isolation of infection  Hand-washing
 Gloves and apron
 Changing beds
 Cleaning of vital signs monitoring equipment
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
 Cleaning ﬂoor or bedside equipment
Percutaneous
procedures
 Phlebotomy e venepuncture
 Cannulation
 Sharps disposal
 Move bed/furniture
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
 Hand-washing
 Isolation of infection
Table 1 (continued )
Processes Tasks
Wound care  Change of dressing
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
 Hand-washing
 Isolation of infection
 Removal of sutures or clips
Activities of daily living  Resting/Sleeping/Lying down
 Eating and drinking
 Use bed pan/commode/toilet
 Take waste to the sluice
 Hygiene e washing/shaving/brushing teeth/
showering/bathing/drying/
 dressing
 Entertainment e Patient-line TV/radio/
 phone
 Move bed/furniture
 Looking for equipment/supplies in storage areas
 Call for help e using nurse call button
Other  Recording an ECG
 Taking a mobile Chest X-ray
 Building maintenance
Table 2
High level causes of prioritised high-risk failures in the ﬁve surgical ward processes
(based on Anderson et al., 2012a).
Hand
washing
Vital
signs
Isolation
of
infection
Handover Medication
delivery
Design X
(environment
and
equipment)
X (vital
signs
chart)
X
(bed-side)
X (handover
room and
handover
sheet)
X
(drug
chart)
Reminders X X X X
Monitoring X X X X
Feedback X X X X
Lack of patient
empowerment
X X X
Measurement X X X
Standardisation X X X
Simpliﬁcation X X X
Leadership and
clear team
roles and
responsibilities
X X X
Education, training
and testing
X X X
Patient safety not
put ﬁrst
X X X
Culture of just
getting the job
done
X X
Lack of facilities X
Culture e low
status of cleaning
X
Implementation of
new equipment
X
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common causes across all of the ﬁve processes, such as equipment
being stored away from the bedspace, lack of reminders and lack of
accountability. By considering the processes simultaneously, the
design work addressed potential failures in the system of interlinked
processes of care around the bedside rather than a piecemeal
approach to speciﬁc failures. Five interlinked design briefs were
therefore formed around the processes of hand hygiene, isolation of
infection, vital signs monitoring, medication delivery and handover
of information.
These briefs were validated by a process expert in each case to
ensure they captured the ﬁndings of the research. A variety of
creative techniques were used, from straightforward brainstorming
and brain-writing sessions (where participants write/draw ideas
before they verbalise them) to more structured lateral thinking
exercises (De Bono, 1995). A range of techniques were deliberately
employed in order to engage thewide variety of stakeholders in the
creative process. This approach combined short term techniques
(focus groups) with longer term methods. Front line healthcare
workers (nurses, doctors and HCAs) were involved in the creative
process through repeated focus groups on three elective surgical
wards at each of the three hospital sites for research. An average of
seven nurses and three HCAs attended each nursing focus group,
ﬁve doctors for the doctors group, and patients were approached
informally when participating. Participants were presented with a
spider diagram of problems and suggested concept areas (without
speciﬁc designs or illustrated concepts), and were asked to use this
as a starting point for their own ideas. Regular co-creation methods
of model making, or sketching etc. were abandoned in favour of a
more ﬂuid approach (staff often had to leave during the session)
where the participants talked through their ideas and the research
and design team captured them in words or sketches.
Running in parallel with this, the duration of the DOME project
allowed for a longer-term approach to be used. De Bono’s tech-
niques were performed both collaboratively among the core
research group (two designers, a clinician and a clinical psycholo-
gist) during brainstorming sessions, and individually. A working
document was created by the designers containing some basic
assumptions and De Bono’s provocations. For example, one
assumption in the task of measuring a patient’s temperature is that
the nurse is present, places the thermometer in the patient’s
mouth, waits and notes down the reading. Provocations question
these assumptions. What if the nurse is absent? This provokes a
range of ideas around the possible remote recording of tempera-
ture. What if the patient took the nurse’s temperature? This is
nonsensical, but could lead to ideas where the patient plays a more
active role in the process. What if the reading could be noted down
without waiting? This could provoke ideas around a thermometer
that stays in the patient, and readings are taken at leisure.
The working document was accessed regularly by the core
research group and updated as the provocations were considered.
These techniques generated a great breadth of ideas for each brief
(some of which are shown in Table 3).
These techniques generated a great breadth of ideas for each
brief (some of which are shown in Table 3).
An iterative design process was followed where ideas were
continuously presented to healthcare workers and patients for
critical input. This was done ﬁrstly with text descriptions of de-
signs, later with sketches, and early stage physical prototypes. Over
the course of numerous feedback sessions, the breadth of concepts
was narrowed down to a few selected designs for each brief. Some
were taken forward to paper prototyping and others to 3D pro-
totypes, with feedback at each stage. A suite of design interventions
was produced at the end of the project, including the ‘CareCentre’
(see Figs. 6 and 7 later), Respiratory Rate Recorder (Fig. 1), a vital
signs trolley (Fig. 2), hand hygiene signage (Fig. 3), medication
dispenser (Fig. 4) and recommendations for a handover room
(Fig. 5). The development of one of these interventions, the ‘Care-
Centre’ is described to illustrate the design process in more detail.
The ‘CareCentre’ was developed primarily in response to the
isolation of infection brief, though Table 3 shows that it also ad-
dresses many of the other briefs, demonstrating the merit of
considering multiple processes and design briefs simultaneously.
One of the main practical problems to be tackled in this brief was
the member of staff neglecting to clean their hands, or to put on
disposable gloves and aprons when appropriate. Shadowing nurses
trying to obey correct protocols revealed that much time was
wasted searching for gloves and aprons (often located far from the
bedside). These observations were extended to include the use of
typical equipment for common bedside processes. It was found that
the medication locker was often inaccessible (located on the wall,
often with a patient obstructing), gloves and aprons were situated
away from the bedside, no ﬂat surface for reviewing or writing
documents, cleaning wipes were not within easy reach (again
located on the wall), and the hand gel at the foot of the bed was
difﬁcult to access from the bedside.
The concept of rationalising all this equipment into a ‘one-stop-
shop’ met with user approval, and through a series of feedback
sessions with front line staff, the list of contents of this all-in-one
unit was deﬁned, as well as its position at the bedside.
The ﬁrst prototype was produced (Fig. 6) and taken to over 120
staff for review. This featured a ﬂat surface for writing documents, a
medication locker, hand gel, cleaning wipes, aprons and gloves, and
a folder holder to contain the patient’s charts. The concept was
designed to hook over the end of the bed.
During the subsequent feedback stage, a manufacturing partner
was approached, and was involved in the next iteration of the
design. The feedback led to the design being free standing,
improved durability, and the addition of a clinical waste bin.
This prototype was the subject of more intense assessment, in
the form of simulation trials. A ﬁctional scenario was created where
a nurse had to perform three common bedside tasks on a patient
(actor): measuring vital signs, givingmedication and the removal of
a cannula. 20 volunteers were ﬁlmed performing these tasks in the
simulation ward (a bay complete with furniture and equipment to
replicate a hospital ward), once with the ‘CareCentre’, and once
without (order randomised). Analysis of the video outputs (map-
ping distance walked, and noting times) is on-going. In addition, 6
prototypes were placed on wards throughout St. Mary’s hospital,
Paddington, for an on-going clinical trial to investigate their impact
on staff adherence to infection control protocols (Anderson et al.,
2012b).
Further feedback from these sessions informed the subsequent
iteration. The designwas reduced in size, a no-touch binwas added,
and the aesthetics improved to produce the manufactured model
(Fig. 7).
7. Discussion
The approach followed in this work will be familiar to ergon-
omists and human factors professionals. In fact the approach has
been formalised in many industries, such as Human Factors
Integration Plans (HFIPs) in industries where human factors is
most established such as defence (HFIDTC, 2010) and rail (Bourne
and Carey, 2011). Yet despite nearly ten years since the publica-
tion of Designing for Patient Safety (Buckle et al., 2003) these
approaches are still not established in healthcare. Some of the
issues that affect the transfer of human factors approaches to
healthcare, and particularly those relevant to the DOME project,
are discussed below.
B. Norris et al. / Applied Ergonomics 45 (2014) 629e638 633
Author's personal copy
Table 3
Design interventions generated for each of the ﬁve bedside processes.
Process Design ideas Failures Causes
Isolation of infection ‘One stop shop’ workstation at end of bed
providing easy access to aprons, gloves and
wipes
Failure wear gloves, aprons; failure to use sterile wipes on equipment Gloves, aprons and wipes not easy to access as
away from the bedside
Improved signage to remind users to clean
hands
Lack of reminders
RFID tagging: initiates a reminder when
approaching the bedside and records
movement to and from the bedside for audit
Lack of reminders; lack of monitoring and
accountability
Hand hygiene ‘One stop shop’ workstation at end of bed
providing easy access to hand gel
Failure to use hand gel Hand gel and gloves not easy to access as stored
away from bedside
RFID tagging: initiates a reminder when
entering the bedside and records movement to
and from the bedside for audit
Lack of reminders; lack of monitoring and
accountability
Improved signage to remind users to clean
hands
Lack of reminders
Vital signs monitoring Computer on wheels to facilitate automatic
transcription of results
Transcription errors No process to record readings, notes made on
pieces of paper and later transcribed into notes
Improved vital signs trolley to include
retractable cables and improve usability
Failure to record observations Time to record observations due to poorly
designed equipment
Mobile phone application to record respiratory
rate
Fail to record respiratory rate Lack of suitable method or equipment to record
rate
Record respiratory rate incorrectly Lack of suitable method or equipment to record
rate
Handover A handover toolkit including recommendations
for a handover space
Information not handed over or handed over incorrectly Poor structure of handover, lack of space, noise,
no access to IT
‘One stop shop’ workstation at end of bed
providing writing space and storage for notes at
the end of the bed
Poor access to notes at the bedside; lack of
writing space
Medicine delivery ‘One stop shop’ workstation at end of bed
providing easy access medication locker
Failure to ensure patient takes medicine Poor access to medication locker behind bed
Medication dispensers and holder with drug
name, peel-back foil to show if medication has
been removed and a reminder if the drug is not
available
No feedback mechanism to see if patient taken
drug; tablets not marked with name;
Patient drug chart Patient doesn’t understand medication and so
doesn’t take it
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7.1. System boundaries
The system under investigation in this project was restricted to
a sub-system of a speciﬁc clinical speciality (an elective surgical
ward). The bedside processes studied are just part of the total care
pathway of an elective surgery patient and excluded diagnosis,
surgery, discharge and recovery within the community. In turn,
elective surgery is only a sub-system of an acute hospital (which
could employ over 5000 staff) and in turn of the wider health
economy. This gives an idea of the size and complexity of entire
healthcare systems and the futility of attempting to understand
them fully in the same way as ergonomics/human factors has
understood other ﬁelds. The selection of a bounded sub-system
could therefore be a limitation of this study. However, most
safety or improvement interventions will in practice, have to work
within boundaries. This makes the systems approach adopted in
this study imperative. Using systems analysis tools such as Vincent
et al.’s (1998) to identify latent inﬂuencing factors (such as
organisational culture, training, maintenance, education and staff
accountability) ensures that design solutions such as potential
RFID tagging and signage would address some of these wider
inﬂuences.
7.2. Transferability of ﬁndings
One of the aims of this study was to demonstrate the value and
effectiveness of a systems and multi-disciplinary approach to
analysing hazards and developing safety solutions in healthcare.
7.2.1. The designs
The selection of the patient bedside as the domain of interest
means that many of the designs might be transferred to other
wards and are non-speciﬁc to elective surgery. Some design in-
terventions such as the Respiratory Rate Recorder and the hand
hygiene signs would also be usable outside of the surgical ward, for
instance in out-patient clinics.
7.2.2. The systems approach
The causal analysis demonstrated that for many of the prioritised
high-risk failures in the surgical ward there were similar underlying
causes, such as availability of equipment, lack of reminders, issues
with education and training and design issues. The subsequent
design briefs and solutions were developed to address these system
level failures; for instance, bringing high frequency use equipment
and supplies such as hand gel, sterile wipes and gloves to the bedside
reduces travel time and increases likelihood of use. This meant that
Fig. 2.
Fig. 3.
Fig. 1.
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one design solution, the CareCentre, could addressmultiple failures
in many processes e.g. hand hygiene, isolation of infection, handover
and medication delivery. This was made possible by applying
modiﬁed Healthcare Failure Mode and Effects Analysis to multiple
healthcare processes in a single healthcare environment.
7.2.3. Sustainability
Common to many of the risks identiﬁed in the study were sys-
tem issues such as lack of accountability, education, procurement
and training. Many of these need long term investment and
interventions to affect a sustainable change. Whilst the solutions
developed in the project will go a small way to inﬂuence these,
promoting a process that identiﬁes these wider system issues will
likely be the most valuable legacy of the project.
7.3. Multi-disciplinary design
Clinicians and designers working alongside each other enabled a
shared understanding of key processes and the development of
commercially viable, systems-based solutions. In particular,
Fig. 5.
Fig. 4.
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clinician involvement provided vital understanding of tacit
knowledge and facilitated the engagement of ward staff and subject
matter experts in the co-design approach. Observing alongside
each other, the designers and clinician were able to share their
perspectives. In this project, dedicated clinician time was secured
through research funding. However in reality, pressure on clinician
time will always be a barrier to developing a workable model of
user-centred design in healthcare. However, there are examples of
the successful transfer of this multi-disciplinary model into normal
healthcare innovation, such as those by the Mayo Clinic in the USA
(Mayo, 2009) and the UK NHS Institute (NHS III, 2009). Also, the
access to the wards and ward staff that was afforded the design
team was unusual, and perhaps can only be achieved when design
projects are embedded within the healthcare organisation.
8. Conclusions
A number of safety interventions for the surgical ward bedside
have been developed through to manufacture (and which are now
subject to clinical trials; see Anderson et al., 2012b,c for details of
the designs and the testing). Evidence of this sort is vital if the
approach promoted in this project is to be adopted more widely in
healthcare. The success of the approach can also be indicated by the
level of engagement that was achieved with staff on the wards, and
the contribution that they made to the co-creation process. Wide
and sustained user engagement in safety analysis and design is vital
to understand risks, to represent user perspectives and to help
implementation. Engagement of this sort also might help to
engender a better understanding of system safety amongst users,
which might ultimately contribute to a better safety culture.
However, ﬁnding ways to further promote and implement the
collaborative analysis between designers, clinicians and manufac-
turers that was developed in this project is a future challenge.
Encouraging cross-fertilisation and sharing of perspectives during
clinician and designer education could help. Financial restrictions
in the healthcare sector mean that large scale collaborative design
projects such as DOME e involving a large amount of time and
resources e are unlikely to become main-stream. Risk assessment
methods such as FMEA and causal analysis require training and
time, but are vital to understand systems contributions to risk, to
avoid a superﬁcial quick-ﬁx and to target efforts where they are
most needed. It may be that realistically, shortened or ‘light’ ver-
sions of thesemethods need to be developed, or resources allocated
to specialist help to administer them. Some of the techniques and
approaches used in this project are already familiar in healthcare;
as stated earlier, the literature contains many healthcare applica-
tions of FMEA for instance. ‘Systems thinking’ has also been widely
promoted in the UK through the principles of Lean and the NHS
Institute’s ‘Productive’ Series. However, badging these techniques
together as a Human Factors approach hopefully will engender
a holistic, human-centred view of safety. This project has demon-
strated that investing in this approach can yield evidence-based
improvements in safety for patients, however the true value will
be in transferring this learning into an operational and feasible
approach for resource-limited healthcare organisations.
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